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With	China	ascendant,	Britain’s	ability	to	shape
human	rights	at	the	UN	now	looks	uncertain
Britain	has	had	a	powerful	influence	at	the	UN	Human	Rights	Council	and	on	development	issues
generally,	writes	Richard	Gowan	(European	Council	on	Foreign	Relations).	But	without	the	UK,
the	EU’s	progressive	voice	will	be	weakened.	The	government	hopes	to	continue	to	exert	influence
through	non-EU	networks,	but	pressure	to	tie	up	trade	deals	may	curtail	its	criticism	of	countries
like	China.
Despite	the	prominence	of	the	Security	Council,	some	of	the	most	sensitive	post-Brexit	UN
diplomacy	will	take	place	at	the	Human	Rights	Council,	the	General	Assembly,	and	across	the	development	system.
Many	of	the	most	important	advances	in	international	cooperation	since	the	end	of	the	cold	war	will	be	at	stake	(even
if	the	processes	involved	can	be	opaque	to	outsiders).	During	the	last	three	decades,	European	countries,	the	US,
and	other	liberal	states	have	placed	human	rights	at	the	centre	of	UN	diplomacy.	They	have	also	pushed	the	UN
development	machinery	to	modernise	and	adapt	to	cover	not	only	traditional	aid	but	also	gender	issues,	climate
change,	and	conflict	prevention.
The	UK	has	been	pivotal	in	both	processes.	At	the	Human	Rights	Council	in	Geneva,	British	diplomats	have	far
deeper	networks	with	non-European	countries	than	most	of	their	EU	peers.	Their	counterparts	in	New	York	speak	on
behalf	of	the	Union	in	roughly	half	of	the	human	rights	cases	in	which	the	bloc	has	a	common	position.	The	UK
typically	argues	for	a	strong	emphasis	on	individual	and	political	rights	rather	than	softer	formulations	on	socio-
economic	rights,	but	is	a	little	more	flexible	on	this	than	some	northern	EU	members.	London’s	influence	on
development	policy	is	even	greater.	It	is	not	only	one	of	the	top	donors	to	UN	agencies,	but	also	a	leading	source	of
ideas.	British	research	organisations	such	as	the	Overseas	Development	Institute	play	a	crucial	role	in	informing	not
only	British	policy	but	also	EU	and	US	debates.
EU	High	Representative	Federica	Mogherini	attends	a	conference	on	supporting	Syria.	Photo:
EU	External	Action	Service	via	a	CC-BY-NC	2.0	licence
In	New	York,	the	UK	and	other	major	European	donors	align	to	promote	aid	effectiveness.	This	does	not	necessarily
make	them	popular	inside	or	outside	the	EU.	The	British	can	take	a	tough	approach	to	aid	negotiations,	keeping	a
constant	eye	on	costs,	whereas	other	EU	members	are	often	willing	to	be	a	little	more	political,	offering	non-Western
countries	sweeteners	for	the	sake	of	a	deal.
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Even	if	many	EU	members	think	the	British	can	be	too	rigid	in	aid	debates,	they	also	admit	that	it	is	nice	to	have
them	around	to	protect	the	bloc’s	budgets.	It	is	unclear	who,	after	Brexit,	will	pick	up	the	slack	in	human	rights
debates	in	New	York	and	Geneva,	and	whether	the	EU	can	remain	robust	in	development	negotiations	without
British	support.	Equally,	there	is	little	certainty	that	the	UK	will	be	able	to	pursue	its	policy	lines	as	firmly	outside	the
EU	as	it	has	done	inside	the	bloc.
While	the	British	usually	urge	the	EU	to	be	firm	at	the	UN,	they	also	benefit	from	the	cover	the	Union	provides	them
on	tough	issues.	At	the	General	Assembly	and	the	Human	Rights	Council,	EU	members	coordinate	their	efforts	on
some	of	the	human	rights	issues	likeliest	to	offend	China,	Myanmar,	and	North	Korea.	This	prevents	Beijing	from
singling	out	an	EU	member	to	penalise.
UN	watchers	differ	over	whether	Brexit	will	increase	or	reduce	the	UK’s	influence	on	aid	and	human	rights	issues.
The	optimistic	interpretation	(for	London)	is	that,	freed	from	EU	coordination	duties,	the	British	will	be	able	to	speak
more	freely	and	combine	with	non-European	states	to	advance	their	agenda.[1]	The	UK	has	a	good	track	record	of
building	coalitions	with	non-Western	countries	on	human	rights	issues,	suggesting	that	it	has	an	effective	strategy	it
can	follow	in	future.	The	pessimistic	interpretation	is	that,	once	outside	the	EU,	Britain	will	have	to	curtail	its
ambitions	to	avoid	being	singled	out	for	criticism.	For	example,	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	that	London	would	take	a	lead
role	on	resolutions	that	could	offend	China	if	it	was	conducting	trade	talks	with	the	country.
The	UK	will	in	any	case	play	a	somewhat	less	prominent	role	on	human	rights	after	2019,	when	its	current	term	on
the	Human	Rights	Council	ends.	It	will	be	three	years	before	the	British	can	rejoin	the	council.
London	will	retain	numerous	channels	through	which	to	influence	both	UN	policy	and	the	EU	after	Brexit	(even
without	some	form	of	EU-UK	coordination)	as	an	influential	member	of	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation
and	Development,	as	well	as	the	boards	of	UN	agencies	such	as	the	Development	Programme.	But	if	its	policy
influence	is	reasonably	secure	for	now,	its	ability	to	shape	the	overall	direction	of	the	political	debate	on	aid	and
human	rights	is	uncertain.	China’s	current	drive	to	embed	its	state-centric	principles	and	language	in	UN	resolutions
is	probably	only	the	first	stage	in	a	drawn-out	effort	to	reshape	the	organisation’s	standards.	Although	Chinese
officials	currently	remain	willing	to	compromise	in	negotiations,	close	observers	suspect	that	they	are	setting	out	an
ideological	stall	to	show	other	states	how	they	aim	to	reshape	the	UN	during	the	next	decade.
If	the	UK	will	have	to	tread	carefully,	other	EU	members	will	simply	need	to	work	out	how	to	fill	the	gap	it	leaves	in
EU	coordination	mechanisms	after	Brexit.	At	the	most	basic	level,	they	will	have	to	divvy	up	negotiating	and	speaking
duties	on	those	issues	which	the	UK	has	led	on	for	the	EU,	chewing	up	time	and	resources.	(By	the	same	token,	the
UK	will	also	need	to	invest	more	diplomatic	effort	in	debates	it	previously	left	to	other	EU	members	to	handle).	The
number	of	European	countries	able	to	substitute	for	the	UK	effectively	is	limited.	Marc	Limon,	director	of	the
Universal	Rights	Group	(which	monitors	the	Human	Rights	Council),	argues	that	even	France	and	Germany	lack
diplomatic	networks	comparable	to	Britain’s.	He	estimates	that	the	next	best-connected	EU	member	is	Portugal,
which	has	a	good	ear	for	non-Western	positions,	while	the	Netherlands	is	strong	on	the	rules	and	norms	of	the
Security	Council	(one	of	the	reasons	that	it	has	partnered	with	the	UK	to	keep	the	US	engaged).	More	conservative
EU	members	–	including	Hungary,	Malta,	and	Poland	–	may	take	the	opening	provided	by	Brexit	to	rein	in	what	they
see	as	the	egregiously	progressive	norms	on	issues	such	as	gender	and	sexuality	pushed	by	more	liberal	members,
sowing	more	dissension	in	the	bloc.	At	a	minimum,	these	conservatives	have	the	potential	to	stop	the	EU
establishing	new	progressive	positions	at	the	UN	as	a	bloc	–	at	a	time	when	other	Western	UN	members,	such	as
Canada	and	Norway,	are	loudly	promoting	liberal	positions.
Nordic	countries	and	the	Netherlands	have	more	influence	on	development	policy	than	Germany,	despite	the	fact
that	Berlin’s	spending	should	make	it	a	superpower	in	this	area.	Even	so,	mid-sized	and	small	European	donors	tend
to	focus	on	specific	UN	agencies	and	priorities	rather	than	the	development	system	in	its	entirety	(a	tendency	suited
to	the	UN’s	sprawling	Sustainable	Development	Goals,	which	set	out	169	targets	for	states	to	adopt).	Finland,	for
example,	focuses	on	women’s	rights,	while	Slovakia	prioritises	security	sector	reform.	This	strategy	is	sensible	in	the
sense	that	it	maximises	a	country’s	influence	on	specific	policy	areas,	but	it	appears	to	have	prevented	many	states
from	gaining	an	overview	of	the	UN’s	activities.	One	notable	exception	is	Ireland,	which	often	manages	complex
General	Assembly	aid	negotiations	because	it	is	can	speak	convincingly	to	both	EU	and	developing	states.
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There	is	a	risk	that,	as	the	UK	adjusts	its	diplomatic	posture	after	Brexit	and	EU	members	get	up	to	speed	on
processes	that	the	British	formerly	led	on	their	behalf,	China	and	other	non-Western	powers	will	intensify	their	efforts
to	reframe	political	debates	on	development	and	human	rights.	Some	UN	officials	believe	that	the	battle	to	defend	a
liberal	vision	of	human	rights	at	the	UN	has	already	been	lost.	The	disruption	arising	from	Brexit	will,	at	a	minimum,
hamper	Europe’s	ability	to	protect	its	principles.
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